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Abstract. Covert channels can be utilized to secretly deliver informa-
tion from high privileged processes to low privileged processes in the
context of a high-assurance computing system. In this case study, we
investigate the possibility of covert channel establishment via software
caches in the context of a framework for component-based operating sys-
tems. While component-based operating systems offer security through
the encapsulation of system service processes, complete isolation of these
processes is not reasonably feasible. This limitation is practically demon-
strated with our concept of a specific covert timing channel based on
file system caching. The stability of the covert channel is evaluated and
a methodology to disrupt the covert channel transmission is presented.
While these kinds of attacks are not limited to high-assurance computing
systems, our study practically demonstrates that even security-focused
computing systems with a minimal trusted computing base are vulner-
able for such kinds of attacks and careful design decisions are necessary
for secure operating system architectures.
Keywords: Covert channels, software caches, high-assurance comput-
ing
1 Introduction
The concept of a covert channel has been described by Lampson as early as
1973 [10]. Covert channels resemble potential means for communication that have
not been designed for communication at all. They can be applied by attackers
to secretly extract data from computing systems. In a different usage context,
covert channels can also be applied to circumvent Internet censorship and other
kinds of content restrictions [4].
In this article, the implementation of covert channels for high-assurance com-
puting scenarios is discussed, in which the highest standards for security pre-
cautions are obligatory. High-assurance computing systems are frequently used
in the context of critical infrastructures and within high-security environments
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(e.g., in the military and intelligence context). In difference to standard “low-
assurance” computing systems, for high-assurance computing systems, “convinc-
ing evidence is required that the system satisfies a collection of critical proper-
ties” [6].
This evidence can be supplied via technical evaluation or formal verification,
but this is usually much easier with component-based operating systems [7],
which rely on a minimized TCB (trusted computing base). In component-based
operating systems, all system services are provided in isolated compartments,
and a micro kernel serves as the central hub for IPC (inter-process communica-
tion). As component-based operating systems heavily rely on the security of the
operating system architecture, the design of the operating system architecture
is specifically targeted by this article.
The contribution of this article includes considerations on the establishment
of covert timing channels in the context of secure operating system architectures.
The covert channel presented in this article is a covert timing channel, which
is based on different timing behaviors depending on the eviction status of a file
system cache. Furthermore, our work includes considerations on the mitigation
of these kinds of covert channels, both in terms of disruption of covert channel
transmissions, and in terms of preliminary prevention due to careful design of
the operating system architecture. This article is based upon the master’s thesis
of Schmidt [12].
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss
related work and how it differs from our work. In Section 3, the threat model
and the concept for this covert channel case study is proposed. In Section 4,
the actual implementation of a cache-based covert channel within the context
of the Genode Operating System Framework is presented. In Section 5, the
covert channel implementation is evaluated and applicable countermeasures are
discussed. In Section 6, we conclude the article.
2 Related Work
The potential of covert channels to circumvent access control policies has been
extensively discussed by Lampson [10], by Kemmerer [8] and by many more
authors.
Cache-based covert channels, side channels and their respective countermea-
sures have been investigated before by Xu et al. [17]. While Xu et al. study
covert channels based upon a CPU’s L2 cache, we specifically target software-
based covert channels in the context of security-critical operating system archi-
tectures. Thereby, we specifically address the problem of the design of secure
operating system architectures. Only by the consideration of secure design pat-
terns for both software and hardware, the problem of covert channels within
high-assurance computing systems can be effectively mitigated.
Kong et al. [9] discuss countermeasures against software-based side channel
attacks. In difference to side channels, covert channels are not based upon side
effects of the computing environment, but they are actively established by at-
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tackers in order to interconnect two initially isolated processes. Moreover, our
work is not only targeted at the creation and limitation of covert channels and
side channels, but it also addresses implications on the security architecture of
future variants of security-critical operating systems.
The work of Wendzel [16] is also very relevant to the area of contemporary
(network) covert channel research. However, in contrast to the work of Wendzel,
the threat model implied by this article is not based on attack patterns in the
context of network policy violations. Instead, we exploit fundamental aspects
of the operating system’s architecture, which should originally be designed to
provide proper isolation between different compartments. In this respect, the
operating system covert channel approach presented by us can be perceived
as a special variant of an insider attack, as the attacker is assumed to have
regular access to some of the operating system’s processes, but he is prohibited
from accessing higher privileged process by the operating system’s policy. Our
considerations on this topic are especially important as, indeed, insider attacks
are considered as one of the most dangerous threats to confidentiality in the
context of DLP (data leakage protection) [13].
Du¨rmuth [3] presents important considerations on covert channels, including
a novel type of covert channel within the PostScript language. In contrast to
Du¨rmuth, we are specifically looking at the operating system level, thus, we are
targeting a slightly different branch of covert channels.
Recently, Peter et al. [11] have presented a study on the possibilities of covert
channels within micro kernels. In difference to these authors, we do not really
care for potential flaws in a specific micro kernel, but we are specifically targeting
a covert channel that is established over central operating system components,
which might be running on top of arbitrary micro kernels.
As we have now discussed the work of other authors, we will continue by pre-
senting the threat model of this kind of covert channel attacks, and by outlining
the conceptual background of the proposed covert channel.
3 Threat Model and Concept for a Cache-based Covert
Channel
The threat model of the presented covert channel can be described as follows.
An attacker wants to extract secret information from a restricted compartment
within the computing system (e.g., within a multilevel security context). The
attacker is assumed to have direct access to the receiving process as part of
the covert channel interaction, but he is unable to directly access the restricted
compartment (i.e., the sending process). By establishing the covert channel, the
attacker would be enabled to indirectly access the restricted compartment, and
he would be able to violate the implemented access control policy. As the receiv-
ing process might be connected to other untrusted resource (e.g., the Internet),
the attack is not restricted to local intrusions at all, but the attacker might be
able to infiltrate the system from any location in the world.
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Regarding the concept of this covert channel, the covert channel is established
over a software-based file system cache. Based on the file system performance,
a hidden stream is modulated by the sender and evaluated by the receiver. As
this type of covert channel is essentially based on the timing behavior of the file
system cache, it can also be classified as a covert timing channel.
The sender modulates a 1-bit by reading in a file residing in its compartment
and evicting the contents of the software cache. For modulating a 0-bit, the
sender performs no file system related actions and waits for a specific threshold
time, which has to be known to both the sender and the receiver. Obviously, this
requires initial compatibility between sender and receiver, but this precondition
applies to all covert channel technologies.
The receiver demodulates the data by repeatedly reading in another file in its
own compartment and measuring the performance of this process. If the read-
in process takes up more time than defined in a specific threshold, a 1-bit is
assumed. Following the read-in process, the receiver waits for an additional time
period. In case the amount of time needed for the read-in process is shorter than
the defined threshold, a 0-bit is assumed. Fig. 1 describes the covert channel
transmission/reception.
Time
Send Receive
Transmission
tR tsav(R)tS tsav(S)
Fig. 1. Covert channel transmission between sender and receiver
The time needed for transmitting one bit is the maximum time needed by the
sender for sending one bit plus the maximum time for the receiver for receiving
the bit. Because transmissions from a permanent storage medium to RAM can
slightly differ in time, both sender and receiver are in need of an additional safety
time frame. Hence, the time tb for transmitting a bit b can be estimated by
calculating the individual read times of data from slow media with an additional
safety time frame tsav for both the size of the sending frame S and the size of
the receiving frame R, as described within Eq. 1.
tb = (tS + tsav(S)) + (tR + tsav(R)) (1)
In this context, the function tsav returns the safety time frame for a given
frame size or transmission time. The time needed to transmit multiple bits can
be calculated by multiplying the result of Eq. 1 n times, where n is the number
of bits to transmit, as shown in Eq. 2.
A Case Study on Covert Channel Establishment 5
ttotal = n ∗ tb (2)
In other words both sender and receiver have fixed time slots for sending or
receiving each bit. Fig. 2 shows multiple transmissions with the covert channel.
The sender sends a pattern with alternating ones and zeros (10101...). The filled
Time
Transmission
t0 t1 t2 t3 ...
Sender
Receiver
Fig. 2. Multiple bit transmissions with the proposed covert timing channel
bars denote file reading periods and the striped bars represent waiting periods.
The receiver will have slightly different read times while receiving a 1-bit in
comparison to receiving a 0-bit.
In the time frame starting at t0 the sender (blue) evicts the whole file system
cache. Consequently, the receiver (red) will measure that the time for reading
his own file exceeds the previously defined threshold and recognize that a 1-bit
is sent. In the time frame starting at t1 the sender waits while having no file
system related activity. Therefore, the receiver recognizes a transmitted 0-bit, as
the time measured for reading his own file is found to be below the threshold.
To gain a better estimation of the length of transmission periods, the follow-
ing preconditions are assumed:
1. The sender always evicts the whole file system cache of size c (MB).
2. The read performance of the slower media (hard drive or SSD) is l (MB/s).
3. Therefore, the sender requires cl seconds to evict the cache (plus the safety
time frame).
4. The receiver reads two blocks from the slower media (equal to 1 MB).
Thus, the total time for transmitting one bit may be calculated by Eq. 3.
tb =
(c
l
+ tsav
(c
l
))
+
(
1
l
+ tsav
(
1
l
))
(3)
Up to this point, the sending and receiving processes consume large portions
of the transmission time for waiting periods. However, optimization is possible,
as the sender does not necessarily have to wait for the end of a whole receiving
period in order to start another transmission. Likewise, the receiver may start
analyzing the transmission while it is still being sent out. If enough data is
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already evicted from the cache, the receiver will already be able to measure a
read time above the previously defined threshold.
As the considered cache is a block-based file system cache, it is generally
sufficient to wait for the time period in which the first block of the receiver’s file
is evicted. Afterwards, the receiver just reads in its own file again in order to
store the file contents within the cache.
The time periods of sender and receiver may jitter slightly: If the receiver
reads in its own file a little bit too late, the sender may have already evicted the
cache for the transmission of the next bit. If it reads in the file a little bit too
early, the file may not yet be evicted from the cache. The optimized version of
the covert channel transmission/reception is depicted in Fig. 3.
Time
t0 t1 t2 t3 ...
Sender
Receiver
t4 t5 t6 t7 t8
Fig. 3. Multiple bit transmissions with the optimized variant of the covert channel
In Fig. 3 it is made visible that sender and receiver have a divergence. Up to a
certain point, such a divergence can be tolerated by the described algorithm, but
if the divergence gets too high, the waiting period of the sender is adjusted. The
primary advantages of the optimized covert channel approach can be summarized
as follows:
– With the optimized transmission pattern, the previously introduced safety
time frames are no longer necessary, which is also formalized within Eq. 4.
tb =
c
l
+
1
l
(4)
– With the new transmission pattern, the receiver only needs to wait for the
time period needed to receive one additional bit at the end of the transmis-
sion, i.e., the receiver needs to additionally read 1 MB (= 2 blocks) in order
to receive the last bit over the covert channel. This matter of fact is also
described in Eq. 5
ttotal = n ∗ tb + 1
l
(5)
– For transmitting a 0-bit the sender does not need to wait for a whole sending
period, but it can wait for a smaller, fixed-size time period.
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Having discussed the theoretical background and the transmission patterns
of the proposed covert timing channel, the next section will describe the specific
implementation of the covert channel within the context of a security-critical
operating system.
4 Implementation of the Covert Channel
The proposed covert channel is based on the Genode Operating System Frame-
work [5], which provides a well-established methodology to create new composi-
tions of component-based operating systems based on different flavors of micro
kernels. The Genode Framework will serve as an example for our experiments on
covert channel establishment, but our considerations equally apply to other kinds
of component-based operating systems. In this context, the following operating
system architecture (Fig. 4) was implemented.
Core
Init
ACPI AHCI RUMPFS
Sender
Receiver
Has access to
PART
BLK
Secret
Sends data to
Fig. 4. System architecture used for this case study
Sender and receiver are distinct processes that are prohibited from any com-
munication with each other in terms of system policy. The sender is a higher
privileged process that may access a secret, but it is not allowed to forward
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the secret, because it cannot write to any lower privileged processes (i.e., it is
implementing the Bell-LaPadula model [2]).
Both sender and receiver are connected to RUMPFS, which is a file sys-
tem service that also implements caching of blocks for all connected clients.
Both processes are explicitly prohibited from communicating with each other
via RUMPFS, but they are both using the same computing resources for the
caching of blocks. While it would also be possible to use individual caches for
each process, this would effectively undermine the primary performance advan-
tages of the cache and the cache could be as well omitted.
ACPI, AHCI and PART BLK are system services that implement low level
hardware access and partitioning of hard drives. INIT and CORE are basic
system services, which establish an interface to the underlying NOVA [14] micro
kernel, and which delegate access control rights and other capabilities to the
overlying processes.
The implementation of the previously described covert channel effectively
demonstrates how a component-based operating system with a minimized trusted
computing base can still be vulnerable to attacks that are based upon very basic
components, which are usually required for performance reasons, such as the
utilized file system block cache.
After we have discussed the architecture of the proposed covert timing chan-
nel within the real world context of a component-based operating system, we will
now look at the evaluation of the covert channel and at possible countermeasures
that can be applied to mitigate this kind of covert channel.
5 Evaluation and Countermeasures
We have practically demonstrated the implementation of the described covert
channel between two processes within the context of the Genode Framework.
For transmissions over the covert channel, both processes are accessing distinct
files, which are subject to caching within a 32 MB block cache. A message of 27
1-bits and 37 0-bits is transmitted in order to evaluate the transmission times
of the covert channel with different block cache sizes.
The theoretical transmission time for a single bit is deducted from the trans-
mission bandwidth of the operating system’s storage subsystem in consideration
of the installed HDD type. In order to compute the total transmission time, the
transmission time of a single bit is multiplied with the number of transmitted
1-bits, and corresponding waiting periods are added for each 0-bit. The actu-
ally measured times were slightly higher as computed, but the computation can
be used for a general assessment of the performance of the covert channel with
different block cache sizes (see also Fig. 5).
As can be seen in Fig. 5, the transmission time of a message is heavily de-
pending on the size of the block cache, and the time needed for evicting the
whole cache is relatively proportional to the size of the cache. For different cache
sizes, Tab. 1 compares the theoretical times with the actually measured times,
and presents the actually measured performance (bit/s).
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Fig. 5. Comparison of theoretical and actually measured transmission times with dif-
ferent block cache sizes
Table 1. Performance evaluation results of the proposed covert channel. Source: [12]
Cache
Size
Read
Time
Wait
Period
Theor.
Time
(1-Bits)
Theor.
Time
(0-Bits)
Theor.
Time
Measured
Time
Performance
2 MB 0.292 s 0.125 s 7.873 s 4.625 s 12.498 s 28.238 s 2.266 bit/s
4 MB 0.566 s 0.25 s 15.273 s 9.25 s 24.523 s 37.175 s 1.721 bit/s
8 MB 1.122 s 0.5 s 30.014 s 18.5 s 48.514 s 65.500 s 0.977 bit/s
16 MB 2.224 s 1.0 s 60.055 s 37.0 s 97.055 s 113.543 s 0.564 bit/s
32 MB 4.473 s 2.0 s 120.762 s 74.0 s 194.762 s 221.501 s 0.289 bit/s
64 MB 8.810 s 4.0 s 237.866 s 148.0 s 385.866 s 436.724 s 0.147 bit/s
Because the theoretical times are only estimated values based upon gen-
eral storage performance values, theoretical and measured times differ, and the
measured performance was marginally lower. With a cache size of 2 MB, the
proposed covert channel is able to reliably deliver a performance of 2 bit/s. Al-
though this number seems small, the covert channel is absolutely fast enough to
deliver small-sized messages such as passwords and cryptographic keys between
sender and receiver.
Regarding countermeasures against the implemented covert channel, we have
been able to disrupt the implemented covert channel by clearing the cache in
fixed intervals. The process of disrupting the covert channel transmission (called
woodpecker) is depicted in Fig. 6.
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ACPI AHCI RUMPFS
Sender
Receiver
PART
BLK
Secret
Wood
pecker
Fig. 6. Mitigating the covert channel with the help of a dedicated disrupting process
The disrupting process works analogous to the sending process. A specific file
is read in repeatedly and, thereby, previously stored contents are evicted from the
cache. By this behavior, a normal process accessing the cache is only minimally
influenced, but the covert channel suffers in two ways: The receiver will notice
additional 1-bits as the read-in period is longer whenever the disrupting process
is also active, and the timing between sender and receiver is deferred, as the
sender also needs more time for reading in its own file.
A successful method to harden the channel against disruptions is to use a
(3,1)-Hamming-Code, which is using three bits instead of one to send a single
bit of the original message. The result of a bit transmission as part of the orig-
inal message is determined by analyzing the bit pattern of three consecutively
transmitted bits, i.e., a pattern of 000, 001, 010, 100 is recognized as a 0-bit, and
011, 101, 110, 111 is recognized as a 1-bit. Consequently, each transmission with
the hardened covert channel demands three times of the size and transmission
time of the original message.
While it would still be possible to disrupt the hardened covert channel by
automatically disrupting the transmission of every single bit, this would also
diminish the performance benefits of using a file system block cache in the first
place. Furthermore, this methodology might also add a constant interval to the
file reading performance, and the covert channel could still be established by
taking this fixed interval into account for each bit transmission.
Thus, only if shared caches would be completely removed from the operat-
ing system architecture, the possibility of such a type of covert channel could
be completely precluded at the cost of a reduced storage access performance.
Moreover, the underlying hardware would still enable the establishment of po-
tential covert channels, although specific hardware cache designs (see Wang and
Lee [15]) are able to provide some degree of non-interference between processes
accessing the same cache. Finally, it would be possible to mitigate covert channel
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attacks via specific guard processes (see Alves-Foss et al. [1]) that have to be
configured to detect irregularities in cache access patterns.
The next section will conclude the article and provide an outlook on possible
opportunities for future research.
6 Conclusion
The implementation of the proposed covert timing channel reveals important
criteria for the implementation of security-driven operating systems architec-
tures. In difference to many other kinds of covert channel attacks, our approach
is solely based upon software means. Because of this, the covert channel is not
depending on any specific type of CPU architecture, but it can be applied to any
component-based operating system with a similar storage processing architecture
as described within the article. Using a file system-based software cache, we are
able to transfer a short message over the covert channel. While the covert chan-
nel can be actively disrupted by other processes, we have been able to stabilize
the covert channel by utilizing a (3,1)-Hamming code. Exhaustive information
on the performance and feasibility of the covert channel can be found in the
master’s thesis of Schmidt [12].
In summary, we are able to demonstrate that the implemented covert channel
is capable of reliably transferring pieces of information from one compartment
to another compartment. Thereby, we are able to effectively circumvent the
operating system’s security policy, and to perform a specific type of insider
attack.
Future research work might include further improvements on the efficiency of
the covert channel, new means for disrupting the channel, and more applications
of similar covert channels.
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